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Foss: Interested Third Parties in Zoning

INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES IN ZONING
GEORGE

B. Foss, JR.*

Each week there are hundreds of local dramas enacted at zoning
hearings throughout the United States. Whether before city or county
governing bodies, planning commissions, or boards of adjustment,
these hearings attract many persons to city hall who would rarely visit
there otherwise. Indeed, zoning has brought the atmosphere of the
town meeting back into local government. However, the supposed
benefits from comprehensive zoning have fallen far short of what
was intended.
There has developed such disparity between zoning in theory and
zoning in practice that the prediction that "in view of the great publicity provided for, and the numerous opportunities afforded for expression of public opinion, it seems extremely unlikely that any special
interests could influence the zoning authorities to enact changes which
would benefit only a small group of persons" 1 has proved to be wishful thinking. 2 The board of adjustment, supposed to provide a safety
valve for the zoning power plant, has become a leak in the boiler instead;3 and the courts, largely wedded to nuisance concepts, have been
reluctant to guard the rights of many persons to continued zoning
protection when local authorities have improperly administered or
failed to enforce their own ordinances. A great need for further inquiry into the nature and practices of zoning is indicated.
There are three parties involved in the zoning process. First, there
are the zoning authorities, who adopt, administer, and enforce the
ordinance. Ideally, they represent the interests of the community and
the public at large. Second, there are the owners and the users of land
upon which zoning restrictions are imposed. Theoretically, the interests of the first and second parties are naturally opposed and conflicting: zoning authorities seek to control the use and development of
*A.B. 1950, Birmingham-Southern College; LL.B. 1951, Duke University; Planning Director, Birmingham, Alabama, 1955-57; Senior Planner-Attorney, St. Petersburg, Florida, 1958; Member of Tampa, Florida, Bar.
'Chamberlain

and Pierson, Zoning Laws and Ordinances, 10 A.B.A.J. 185, 186

(1924).
2Freund, Some Inadequately Discussed Problems of the Law of City Planning
and Zoning, 24 ILL. L. REv. 135 (1929); Note, 9 U. Cm. L. REV. 477, ,186 (1942).
3Reps, Discretionary Powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 280 (1955).
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land for the good of the community, while the individual property
owner desires to utilize his land without governmental interference.
Third, there are those who are to be particularly benefited by zoning
restrictions on the land of others, as, for example, those owning property on residential streets or in residential districts.4 Residential property owners are cited merely as an example, for, as Horack notes: 5
"[T]he problem of land management is to establish such a
pattern of uses that one use will not seriously interfere with another. More specifically, we must recognize that it is just as
injurious to the welfare of a community [and to third party
interests] to permit residential development of land which is
needed for industrial expansion as it is to permit industrial expansion to retard the development of a prosperous residential
neighborhood."
A person may be both a second and a third party: he is a second
party in his interest in the free use and enjoyment of his own property and a third party in his interest in zoning protection for the community and from his neighbor. In his third-party capacity, his interest
parallels that of the first party, the zoning authorities, in establishing
and maintaining sound zoning.
The interest of the general public in the adoption and enforcement
of zoning ordinances is paramount. However, zoning is not carried on
in a vacuum, and in particular cases the interest of the third party is
important not only for the protection of that interest but for the
protection of the public at large as well. Why have urban blight and
its attendant ills continued despite zoning? What can be done to
utilize zoning in a better fashion to make it a more effective remedy
for some of these ills
HISTORY OF ZONING

Factual

In determining reasons for the present state of zoning affairs, one
48 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORTONS 83 (3d ed. 1957).
5Land Controls in an Urban Society, 28 ROCKY MT. L. Rxv. 502, 504 (1956). See
also Brentz, Industrial Zoning to Exclude Higher Uses, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1261

(1957).
6A general philosophical approach to "social control" as opposed to the "competitive mechanism" is discussed in Stone, The Myths of Planning and Laissez
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should recall Holmes' aphorism that "a page of history is worth a
volume of logic."
Zoning in the western world was first practiced in ancient Rome,
where, under the Caesars, certain industries were excluded from the
center of the city, setback restrictions were used to keep building from
encroaching upon public streets, and building heights were regulated.
With the collapse of Roman civilization, zoning does not appear to
have been practiced again until the 1800's, when certain German cities
adopted detailed regulations controlling the use and development of
urban land. The practice spread to other cities and countries on the
7
Continent and is highly developed there today.
In the United States zoning grew out of the law relating to nuisances, restrictive covenants, and various types of police power regulation of private property, such as fire, building, sanitary, and tenement
codes. In 1904-1905 Massachusetts adopted statutes permitting the
regulation of building heights in downtown Boston; such regulation
was upheld in 1909.8 Earlier the California courts had upheld property regulations aimed at Chinese laundries, and in 1909 Los Angeles
adopted an ordinance dividing the city into residential and industrial
districts. The first comprehensive zoning ordinance, however, was that
of New York City, adopted in 1916 after years of study by a committee
headed by Edward M. Bassett, an attorney. The New York ordinance,
based on the laws and experiences of German cities, provided a model
for other municipalities, which began adopting zoning en masse.
During the 1920's a committee of the United States Department of
Commerce prepared several drafts of a model enabling act which furnished guides for legislation in many states. The United States Supreme Court gave zoning its formal blessing in 1926 in the leading
case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty CoY
Legal
The factual history of zoning is familiar; less familiar is the story
of how zoning got off on the wrong legal foot. The fact that it did
has contributed greatly to its ineffectiveness. The trend of court
decisions today indicates that many courts are getting onto the right
Faire,18 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1949).
7See 1 LEwis, PLANNING THE MODERN CITY 254-263 (1949); generally
CITY PLANNING AND ZONING (1922).

WILLIAMS,

SWelch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
9272 U.S. 365, 54 A.L.R. 1016 (1926).
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foot, and it appears that zoning is becoming less mysterious and more
effective where this occurs.10
In the early 1900's, the burning legal problem was whether the
use and development of property could be restricted by zoning under
the police power rather than under the power of eminent domain, the
exercise of which admittedly would have been too expensive for cities
to undertake. Although property regulation had been upheld under
the health, safety, and morals aspects of the police power when the
demonstrable relation between the ends sought and the means used
was great and immediately apparent,:1 many lawyers doubted that the
more indirect benefits to be derived through zoning would justify such
use of the power. The judicial view of the general welfare aspect of
the police power was not then as broad as it now is, and the concensus at that time was that courts might not be kindly disposed
toward arguments to enlarge it.
The dilemma was solved - at least for strictly legal purposes - by
some amazing juristic rationalization on the part of the Supreme Court
of Missouri in 1911. The court, on rather tenuous grounds of health,
safety, and morals, upheld an ordinance that had the practical effect
of excluding billboards from many residential areas. 1 2 Fallacies in
the court's reasoning have been belabored a number of times, and it
has been said that what the court really meant was that billboards
could be regulated under the police power because they were aesthetically unpleasing and tended to depress property values in otherwise
good neighborhoods. 1 3 Predicating the decision on general welfare
grounds, however, required more vigor than the court could muster.
Nevertheless, the holding was seized upon by lawyers and courts to
justify comprehensive zoning. Although zoning theory has been on
l0Best v. Zoning Board, 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958); see Craig, Zoning Law,
20 U. Prrr. L. REy. 279 (1958).
"See 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corps. 409-17, 605-09, 639-40 (1949).
12St. Louis Gunning Adv. Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911),
appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (1913). Billboards were nasty things; they were
dangerous because they might fall over or blow down and injure people; rubbish
collected around them so that they might catch fire and lay waste the city; they
furnished hiding places for criminals and miscreants who might jump out upon
people from behind; the areas behind them were used for privies and for the
practice of the vilest forms of prostitution, and so forth.
'3d. at 207; 137 S.W. at 963 (dissenting opinion). See also Dukeminier, Zoning
for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955);

Landels, Zoning: An Analysis of Its Purposes and Its Legal Sanctions, 17 A.B.A.J.

163 (1931); Note, 23 GEo. WASH. L. -REv. 730 (1955).
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seemingly firm ground in that courts have upheld it, the actual practice has often been on quicksand in that courts have knocked it down
14
in too many cases.
The situation has been changing over the years as more courts
have tended to uphold aesthetic zoning regulations. The word aesthetics has unfortunate emotional connotations. Practically speaking,
however, when the matter of promoting aesthetics is discussed, protection and stabilization of property values are implied as well. Hardheaded businessmen who are wary of the term will nevertheless pay
more for an attractive property in a well-kept area than for an ugly
one in a slum, even though the combined costs of land and building
construction may be the same.' 5 Recent rulings of the United States
Supreme Court leave no doubt that reasonable laws to promote local
aesthetics or protect property values will be upheld under the general
welfare aspect of the police power. 16 Thus zoning legality is merging
with reality, and judicial conceptions are catching up with public
conceptions of the public welfare.
Practical
Zoning can do practically nothing to improve the public morals;
it can do a little to protect health, still more to insure safety; but it
can do most for a community by promoting the general welfare. 17
14For a general discussion see Baker, Aesthetic Zoning Regulations, 25 MicH.
L. REv. 124, 136 (1926). See also Note, 50 COLUN. L. REv. 202 (1950). For excellent
and exhaustive articles on the history, purposes, and methods of zoning see McDougal, The Influence of the Metropolis on Concepts, Rules and Institutions Relating
to Property, 4 J. PuB. L. (1955); Young, City Planning and Restrictions on the
Use of Property,9 MINN. L. REv. 593 (1925).
' 5See Light, Aesthetics in Zoning, 14 MINN. L. REv. 109 (1930); Sayre,
Aesthetics and Property Values: Does Zoning Promote the Public Welfare?, 35
A.B.A.J. 471 (1949).
16Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding
Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
See also Note, 35 NEB. L. REV. 143 (1955).
17There is less justification for zoning to promote health today than there was
in earlier years; health is more the concern of a housing code. See Guandolo,
Housing Codes in Urban Renewal, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1956). As for safety,
today there are better methods of controlling traffic, though increasing motor vehicle registrations may have outrun the improvements in technology. Zoning opportunities in the field of safety are largely wasted, however, when cities indulge
in the pernicious practice of strip-zoning for business or industry along major
streets. Loading such streets with "traffic generators" cuts down the design capacity
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There has never really been much doubt -except as created in the
minds of city planners and others reading judicial decisions - that the
moving consideration prompting the adoption of zoning ordinances
has been improvement of social and economic conditions rather than
promotion of public health, safety, or morals. In every American city
where the filling station invaded "good" residential districts, or where
the odoriferous fat-rendering plant invaded the "good" industrial
district, people resented the intrusion of such elements in their unzoned communities and brought pressure on the local governing body
to do something about it.
The New York City experience is not only illustrative but classic,' s
as explained in the recent revision of Metzenbaum's work on zoning. 19
There were probably more reasons for New York City to adopt zoning
to promote health, safety, or morals in 1916 than now, since there are
now better technological methods for dealing with such problems. It
is curious to note, however, that when the push came it was from
the disgruntled property owners themselves.20
When the various phases of the history of zoning are analyzed
it can be seen that the courts have had a lot to do with the failure of
zoning to accomplish many of its purposes. When particular zoning
cases have arisen and when little demonstrable relation between zoning restrictions on certain land and the public health, safety, or morals
has been shown, it is small wonder that many restrictions have been
of such traffic carriers, leading to more congestion and danger and eventually
hastening the need for limited-access freeways to move the traffic. A number of
related matters are discussed in Williams, Deficiencies of Zoning Law and Legal
Decisions, PLANNING 164-70 (1950).
1sSee Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 87 HARv. L. REv. 834, 858 (1924).
191 MErZENBAUM, ZONING 66-67 (1955):

"New York City witnessed an astounding loss of tax values affecting its public
treasury, in addition to an unbelievable loss to the property owners when, along
the lower portion of Fifth Avenue, garment factories, with their army of workers,
invaded the then high class shopping and retail district which was located at
that time in that area.
"Values fell to less than half; stores ran races with each other in vacating their
locations and in seeking other sites, and the property owners found themselves
despoiled of a great fraction of their property values."
20For the St. Louis experience see Baker, The Constitutionality of Zoning Laws,

20 ILL. L. Rzv. 213, 229, n.117 (1955). There has been disagreement among planners, attorneys, real estate men, and others about what part economic and social
forces play in zoning. For a number of interesting and conflicting viewpoints about
these and a host of other factors, see Symposium, Zoning in the United States, in 155
ANNALS OF THE AMERIcAN ACADEMy OF POLrTICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, Part
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judicially removed and neighborhoods have been eased onto the path
2
toward urban blight. '
THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE

In general, a zoning ordinance should be adopted only after careful study has been made of the history and development of the area
proposed to be zoned. Statistics should be gathered and analyzed,
trends identified and projected, and existing land uses mapped. The
results of such studies should be presented to a planning or zoning
commission for consideration. Public hearings should be held so that
community opinion and property owners' thinking may be expressed.
The commission and the local governing body should then make
some determinations as to the goals desired to be achieved, such as
whether to encourage heavy industry. Zoning should be adopted "in
accordance with a comprehensive plan," "for the purpose of promoting
health, safety, morals, or the general welfare

....

"22

Once a zoning ordinance is adopted, amendments and other forms
of relaxation of zoning restrictions should be undertaken only after the
same type of careful planning though on a smaller scale, 23 subject to

the requirement of public hearings for those who may be affected.24
Zoning restrictions should not be relaxed or changed except for strong
and compelling reasons.25 All of this is familiar zoning theory as set
out in statutes and case law. When zoning practice is investigated,
however, it is found that much of the deluge of criticism leveled at
the manner in which zoning restrictions have been changed, relaxed,
administered, and enforced has come from the same men who formerly
were the strongest proponents of zoning. 26 With some exceptions,
1931).
2lThis partially explains why 58 AM. JUR. devotes fully 30 pages to "Relief from
Zoning Restrictions" and only 9 to "Enforcement of Zoning Regulations."
2FLA. STAT. §§176.04, 176.02 (1957). But see Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955).
23Michigan-Lake Bldg. Corp. v. Hamilton, 340 Il. 284, 172 N.E. 710 (1930).
24FLA. STAT. §§176.04-.15 (1957).
25Chandler, The Amendment of Zoning Ordinances, in 4 LEGAL NOTES ON LOCAL
GOVERNMENT 10 (1938); Maltbie, The Legal Background of Zoning, 22 CONN. B.J.
2 (1948). See also authorities cited in note 57 infra.
26See Freund, supra note 3; Reps, supra note 4. See also Bassett, A Warning As
to Unlawful Zoning, American City 119 (Jan. 1947); Braver, The Abuse of Zoning
Power, 35 CH. BAR REG. 413 (1954); Gaylord, Zoning: Variances, Exceptions and
Conditional Use Permits in California, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 179 (1958); Siegel, Slum
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zoning administration and enforcement have been poor or lacking,
and the actual process of granting zoning amendments, variances, and
exceptions has been worse. In some places it has even been corrupt.
It is true that some of the more dramatic abuses of land use and
development have been lessened and that in recent years there have
been a few good examples of comprehensive revision and tightening
of zoning laws. In the majority of cities, however, first parties - the
zoning authorities- have simply not done the job of administration,
enforcement, and periodic revision necessary to a sound and healthy
zoning system. The burden of enforcement has fallen more and more
on third parties, and narrow judicial attitudes have hampered their
efforts. Third-party litigants have been thrown out of court on questions of standing and special damages when the facts of the cases clearly
indicated zoning violations.27 The end products of this vicious situation are loss of zoning protection to the community at large as well
as to third-party owners of developed land; continued urban blight
resulting in more slums; increased cries for more federal aid for slum
clearance, urban renewal, and public housing; and loss of public confidence in zoning.
An examination of the political, economic, and social background
is vital to a good understanding of how this situation arose. There
are at least three primary reasons for the failure of zoning on the local
level.
First, for the most part zoning, until very recently, has been adopted
by most cities as a "package deal," prepared by persons knowing
something about zoning, then turned over for administration and enforcement to persons knowing little or nothing about it. In smaller
communities the same person often serves as city engineer, fire marshal,
and building, plumbing, electrical, and gas inspector; he perhaps
even serves as fire and police departments as well. He may do a good
job with the zoning ordinance too if it is simple and everyone knows
his neighbor's business. The job is more difficult in larger towns and
cities. The primary concern of building and similar departments is
the structural safety and adequacy of buildings and physical facilities.
When a zoning violation "doesn't hurt" in that the neighbors do not
complain vociferously about it, it will often be ignored or condoned,
Prevention -A Public Purpose,35 CHI. BAR. Rrc. 151 (1954); Notes, 25 ILL. L. Rv.
817 (1931); 45 Ky. I.J. 496 (1957); 103 U. PA. L. Rxv. 516 (1955); Comments, 48
Nw. U.L. REv. 599 (1953); 48 Nw. U.L. Rv. 470 (1953).
27Boucher v. Novotny, 102 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1958); O'Brien v. Turner, 255 Mass.
84, 150 N.E. 886 (1926).
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or the violator will be encouraged by the building department to
apply for an amendment or variance to "legalize" the violation. Experience shows that when this situation exists, builders and developers
are keenly aware of it; and the more unscrupulous among them will
begin work without permits, knowing that a desired yard or area
variance will be forthcoming more easily once a foundation has been
poured. Under such a system zoning enforcement becomes a farce,
and zoning protection is illusory.
Second, members of local governing bodies, planning commissions,
and boards of adjustment tend to be "real estate development oriented" rather than "zoning protection oriented": they often consider
it more important that vacant properties be improved by structures
than that the zoning ordinance and map be observed. These are lay
groups, often having as members persons who are themselves financially interested in real estate development, though one should not
set a fox to guard a henhouse. Land use discussions in such groups
are usually dominated by these persons, who are presumed to know
more about it than the others. A group's duty to the city is considered
discharged when an "improvement" brings in increased tax revenue
from the land in question. Even though a net loss to the community
may result when the depreciation of surrounding property values is
subtracted from the increased value of the "improvement," this is
not considered unless the owners or occupants of the lands come out
in force to oppose the relaxation of zoning restrictions.2
2SMuch more study needs to be given to the economics of zoning. Most cities
are over-zoned for business and industry, usually brought about by political pressure from owners of vacant land held for speculation who want their land zoned
so it will bring the best price. Strip-zoning of land along major traffic arteries is
an example. Much of this land could be used for residences by proper platting,
with marginal access streets and use of trees and shrubs for screening; instead it
often goes begging for years, since there is insufficient demand for so much business
and industrial land. Thus much of the land within the city remains idle, producing
little tax revenue; land is gradually ruined for residential purposes because of
scattered business development and lack of zoning protection for persons who
might want to develop portions for homesites; and the approaches to downtown
sections become business slums. When other over-zoned land is considered, asking
prices are higher than similarly situated residential land. Sophisticated men in
business and industry, however, will not pay speculative prices for necessary land
and hence locate their plants outside the city or pressure for the rezoning of
cheaper residential land, which, if granted, causes just that much more over-zoning.
The community loses in these circumstances, and even many speculators are left
holding the bag, having paid inflated prices for business and industrially zoned
land in hope of finding bigger fools to sell it to. See McDOUGAL and HABER,
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Property values are not the only values sought to be protected by
zoning, and even when they alone are considered the effect of a particular improvement on a neighborhood or area can be difficult to
predict. The "real estate development oriented" man in such a situation usually gives this argument for relaxing zoning restrictions: "Let's
be practical - we don't know what this thing will do, but we do know
that the proposed building will improve the property and raise the
taxes, and only a few of the neighbors are complaining anyway, so
let's pass it and get on to the next item on the agenda." This is his
29
entire conception of planning and zoning.
Third, second parties - property owners - desiring relaxation of
zoning restrictions have developed more economic and political power
than third parties desiring zoning protection. Economically, the man
with a vacant lot who wants to build something not permitted or to
sell his property at a higher figure if he can get zoning relief has little
to lose and much to gain if he can prevail. He is not reluctant to
hire a lawyer and spend money if it will bring him profit. To persons
owning developed property in the neighborhood, notice - if they
get notice, which often they do not - of his application for rezoning,
a variance, or an exception usually comes as a shock; but the realization that eventually their property values may be substantially depreciated if the zoning ordinance is relaxed is slower to arrive. 30 Thus
PROPERTY, WVEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

448-49 (1948);

Coffin, Appraising Property Zoned for Business, J. Amer. Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers 29-33 (Oct. 1934). For comparisons of actual land uses in several cities see
BARTHOLOMEW, LAND USFS IN AMERICAN CITIES 126-31

(1955).

29Michigan-Lake Bldg. Corp. v. Hamilton, 340 Ill. 284, 172 N.E. 710 (1930).
See also Hauser, Is Zoning Outmoded?, 7 Am. MuN. L. Rv. 128 (1942), in which
the author advances the thesis that courts went along with zoning mainly to protect property values, but notes criticism to the effect that zoning has not worked
out so as to accomplish that purpose.
3OThe difference in a zoning relaxation or violation from a traffic violation is
that when someone runs a red light and collides with another car, the damage is
immediate and apparent: one can see the blood, the mangled limbs, the wrecked
vehicles. A zoning error is rarely that dramatic; urban blight resulting in part
from erosion of zoning protection is more like cancer. The general public and
local newspapers think things are fine because the city has a zoning ordinance, and
that occasional neighborhood eruptions are caused by soreheads who are trying
to resist "progress," in the name of which more zoning crimes are committed than
any other one thing. Suddenly the city realizes that it has another slum on its
hands. Preceding this realization a more or less gradual decline in neighborhood
appearance and property values has occurred. Real estate salesmen, the majority
of whom make their living selling and reselling developed properties, are the best
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the neighborhood rarely fights as hard for zoning protection as the developer or speculator does for relaxation or amendment. Politically,
every builder and developer appreciates the value of having friends at
city hall, but many of the people who show up at zoning hearings
have never been in that building before except to pay a parking
ticket.31 With these and other forces and influences at work, the great
disparity between zoning theory and practice has continued apace.
Often there is a great gulf between the thinking of planners and
administrators on one side and real estate appraisers and judges on
the other. Planners are concerned with the large picture of balancing
land uses in the light of foreseeable needs of the city and, in preparing
zoning ordinances and maps or effecting periodic revisions or considering amendments or variances as to particular properties, with avoiding
inconsistent and conflicting uses and developments that experience
has shown lead to trouble. Each problem is only a part of the total
problem of an urban or rural area; it cannot be effectively solved
or dealt with if the larger area is disregarded or slighted.
Appraisers are generally concerned with particular properties and
seek to determine value according to the highest and best use of the
land. The emphasis is on the individual property; the surrounding
area is considered in determining the value and potentiality of the
individual property rather than vice versa. The phrase highest and
best use of the land has no place in zoning, as there are always individual properties that must be restricted, so that their individual
highest and best uses cannot be realized. If they were not restricted,
other properties and whole areas might be damaged when the individual properties were put to their "highest and best uses." Yet the
phrase, or its equivalent, is often heard in zoning hearings, uttered
by persons "real estate development oriented," and occasionally written into court opinions, usually with devastating results to the interests of those opposing amendment or relaxation of zoning restrictions.
American courts historically have leaned over backward to protect
friends of zoning when they have realized that the erosion of its protection results
in lower commissions on their sales. It does not require an appraiser to tell that
a developed property brings a better price if it is not near a clashing, detracting
land use.
-'When real estate developers sit on boards, commissions, and councils and other
real estate men apply for zoning relief, it is generally forthcoming. Too, persons
who have contributed to the campaigns of successful candidates have better chances
of getting favorable zoning decisions that those who have not.
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the individual property owner from governmental interference with
his free use and enjoyment of land. This tendency when applied in
zoning cases has resulted in many courts upholding zoning in theory
but striking it down in practice. In a typical case a court will piously
declare that zoning is a proper exercise of the police power, to be
commended as a remedy for dealing with many of the problems of
growing cities, but will hold that in this particular case the restric32
tions on the property are unreasonable.
With the foregoing considerations in mind, some of the peculiarities of zoning law become subject to better understanding.
ZONING LAW AD NUISANCES

"Zoning is not based on the doctrine of common-law nuisance. Good zoning enabling acts and ordinances do not even
33
use the word nuisance."
One of the historical antecedents of zoning is the law of nuisances,
however,34 and from this fact a number of unfortunate consequences
have flowed despite the admonition by Mr. Justice Sutherland that
S2Often the property in question is vacant, and relaxation of zoning restrictions
is opposed by neighboring owners of developed property. Rarely will there be
any indication in the opinion as to whether there is other vacant property available for the purposes desired by the proponents of relaxation or "dezoning," or
of the court's having considered the possible effect of its holding on other property
not in the immediate vicinity. Since World War II courts in a whole series of cases
have upheld rezoning of single-family property to multiple-family, or have ordered
one-family restrictions relaxed for the purpose, because of the housing shortage;
in such cases little or no consideration has been given to the availability of other
land already zoned for apartments in other neighborhoods. For a collection of cases
see Comment, 46 ILL. L. Rxv. 745 (1951). See also Kennedy v. Evanston, 348 Ill.
426, 181 N.E. 312 (1932); 33 TzxAs L. R1v. 763 (1955). Only rare cases note the
use of planning studies and expert opinion in matters of zoning relaxation, e.g.,
Wilcox v. Pittsburgh, 121 F.2d 835, 873 (3d Cir. 1941); Raskin v. Morristown, 21
N.J. 180, 121 A.2d 378 (1956).
33BAsmr, ZONING 93 (1940). See also Arensberg, Zoning, 31 PA. BAR Ass'N
ANN. REx'. 295 (1925). Ryan v. Warrensburg, 342 Mo. 761, 770, 117 S.W.2d 303,
307 (1938), states: "The city . .. is merely acting to prevent the operation of any
business of any kind in a district it has zoned as residential only, and from which
it has excluded all business establishments. Its authority to do this is the zoning
act, and not the law of nuisances. It has such authority if a valid zoning statute
grants it, and the law of nuisances has no more to do with this question than
would Einstein's theory of Relativity."
3
4See BEuscHmR, LAND USE CONTROLS, c. I, p. 7, c. IV (1955).
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"the law of nuisances .

.

. may be consulted, not for the purpose of

controlling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in the process of
ascertaining the scope of the power." 35 Few courts have paused to
consider the differences between nuisance and zoning law, but have
applied the rules of one to the other. However, as stated in a Cali36
fornia case:
"The distinction between the power to prohibit nuisances and
the power to zone is exceedingly important. The power over
nuisances is more circumscribed in its objects; but once an undoubted menace to public health, safety, or morals is shown,
the method of protection may be drastic. Private businesses may
be wholly prohibited .. . ; and other businesses ... may be excluded from certain districts . . . . In these cases, the public

welfare demands even the destruction of existing property
interests ....
"Zoning is not so limited in its purposes. It may take into
consideration factors which bear no relation to the public
health, safety, or morals, but which come within the meaning
of the broader term 'general welfare.' It deals with many uses
of property which are in no way harmful."
There are two unfortunate consequences of confusing nuisance
with zoning law: (1) When the relation between the means (zoning
restrictions) and the end (community betterment) has not been immediate and easily demonstrable, courts have tended to vitiate restrictions on particular land; 37 (2) when private citizens and property
owners' associations have sought to enjoin violations or changes in
zoning restrictions, they have been met by the rule that special damages must be alleged and proved before courts will consider cases on
their merits, even if the facts clearly indicate illegal zoning practices.
Although at common law a property owner could go into equity
35Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (emphasis added). See Bettman,
supra note 18, at 841; Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 COLUM. L. Rav.

457 (1941); Note, 17 VA. L. REv. 202 (1930); Comment, 39 YA.E L.J. 735 (1930).
36Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 316, 295 Pac. 14, 20 (1930)

(retroactive

zoning case).
37"What reasonable relation has the setback line, or space in front of houses in
ordinary residence districts, to the health, safety, or morals of the community? ...
To bring this, and other like regulations, under the police power, would be to
sweep away constitutional guaranties on the ownership of property. It is regula-

tion run mad." Appeal of White, 287 Pa. 259, 267, 134 Atl. 409, 412 (1926).
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to enjoin a private nuisance, it was much later before the courts would
allow him an injunction against a public nuisance, 38 and then only
upon allegation and proof of special damages different in kind and
character from those sustained by the public at large.3 9 The special
damages rule was carried over into the enforcement of fire, building,
and similar laws,40 then bodily into zoning law as well,41 though there
is little practical or logical justification for the rule as to injunctions
in any of these areas. There need not be a multiplicity of injunction
suits - one will suffice. If, as is urged, frivolous bills for injunction
will be instituted, there is a deterrent at hand in the shape of an
action for malicious prosecution. The minority rule in zoning cases
does not require a showing of special damages, or it provides that
the mere violation constitutes a type of special damages. This rule
will be examined later.
The result of the majority rule is that when aggrieved persons
cannot get the authorities to act to abate zoning violations or to
refrain from illegal zoning practices, courts deny them any remedy at
all, or deny them the only adequate remedy in the circumstances, or
require that they resort to expensive and time-consuming efforts to get
the authorities to act.42 Meanwhile the illegal practice becomes a fait
accompli or the illegal structure is built, and the damage is almost
beyond repair.
A few ill-advised ordinances and statutes have declared that zoning
violations are public nuisances, 4 3 further clouding the issues; and
many courts have decided zoning cases as combination zoning and
3sSee McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U.
REv. 27 (1948).

FLA. L.

BoSee Chaffee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1920: Equitable Relief Against
Torts, 34 HADv. L. REv. 388 (1921); McClintock, Discretion to Deny Injunction
Against Trespass and Nuisance, 12 MINN. L. REv. 565 (1928). The reasoning behind this rule was that otherwise a person creating a public nuisance could be
held individually liable in a multiplicity of damage suits brought by all members
of the public more or less injured by the nuisance, and that regulating public
nuisances was a job for the authorities rather than private parties. See Kratovil
and Harrison, Eminent Domain, 42 CALF. L. REV. 596, 611 (1954).
4OThe leading case is First Nat'l Bank v. Sarlls, 129 Ind. 201, 28 N.E. 434 (1891).
4'The leading case is Holzbauer v. Ritter, 184 Wis. 35, 198 N.W. 852 (1924).
For background cases see McQuilin, Injunction As a Remedy to Restrain Passage,
Test Validity and Prevent Enforcement and Violation of Municipal Ordinances, 62
CENT. L.J. 257, 262 (1906). See also Notes, 21 B.U.L. Rav. 556 (1941); 13 Mo. L.
Rv. 124 (1948); 37 YALE L.J. 387 (1928); Annot., 54 A.L.R. 366 (1928).
4
2See Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1135 (1954).
43
See Fidelity Trust Co. v. Downing, 224 Ind. 457, 68 N.E.2d 789 (1946).
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nuisance cases. 44 So far nuisance law seems to have hindered the development and enforcement of zoning law more than it has helped.
Surprisingly enough, however, when zoning principles have been
utilized in purely nuisance cases, "judicial zoning" has been the result, especially in rural areas. 45
ZONING LAW AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

46

Restrictive covenants are contractual obligations applicable to specific property, imposed upon that property and its future owners by
the present owners. Covenants may be considered as property interests
in the land itself, or as merely contractual obligations or interests
running with the land. 4 7 Third-party beneficiaries may enforce cove-

nants by damage suits for their breach or by injunction to restrain or
abate breaches. 48 Restrictive covenants came into use in this country
during the 1800's and are widely used today to create and preserve
desirable neighborhoods, whether for residential, business, or even
49
industrial purposes.
Zoning bears an amazing resemblance to restrictive covenants. In
upholding zoning restrictions limiting the use of land in a partially
built-up area to single-family dwellings, the highest court of New
York discussed the advantages of such districts, noted that the police
power was not confined to protection of public health, safety, and
morals but included "promoting public convenience or general prosperity," and stated that "what was once a matter of voluntary submission to restrictive covenants in grants has become a matter of com44Jacobsen v. Padgett, 108 So.2d 303 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
4
5See Beuscher and Morrison, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases,
1955 Wis. L. REV. 440; Note, 54 MICH. L. REv. 266 (1955); Annot., 166 A.L.R. 659
(1947). But see Note, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1918).
4GQuestions involved here are to be distinguished from those arising out of
conflict between zoning and restrictive covenants or similar matters; see Lonshein,
The Conflict Between Restrictive Covenants and Zoning Laws, 13 N.Y.U. INTRA.

L.

REV. 68 (1957).
47See Botts, Removal of Outmoded Restrictions, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 428 (1955).
4

8See note 54 infra.
49The difficulties with covenants as land use control devices are that they (1)
can apply only to very limited land areas, immediately outside which conditions
can be created against which covenants do not protect, (2) are of limited life, (3)
cannot be easily modified to meet changing conditions unanticipated at the time
they were imposed, (4) are expensive and troublesome to enforce, and (5) cannot
be taken into account in issuing or withholding building permits.
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pulsory obedience to ordinances having the force of statutes." 50 It
might be said that zoning is a system of restrictions similar to covenants, imposed by the local governing body as agent for the owners
of affected land. Both zoning and restrictive covenants purport to
regulate or control many things not contemplated by the law of
nuisances, but it is the control of these things that is vital to healthy,
co-ordinated urban - and, to a lesser extent, rural - growth.
It is interesting to speculate as to why early writers on zoning
purposes, and perhaps the philosophy of zoning, did not call more
attention to the similarities between restrictive covenants and zoning.
Some did hint or imply that zoning was an extension of the purposes and the theory of private covenants embodying building and
use restrictions, 5' but they seemed reluctant to say so, as if they realized that they were treading on dangerous ground. The key to the
answer is, again, the position taken by many courts in the early years
of zoning in predicating the power to zone solely on health, safety,
and morals and in their reluctance to consider aesthetics and protection of property values except incidentally, whereas in the field of
private restrictive covenants the latter considerations are of utmost
importance. Those interested in zoning appear to have bent over
backward to avoid discussing the real purposes of zoning when before
the courts directly or when writing about zoning. In other words, they
kept up the pretense so as not to give courts grounds for knocking
out zoning restrictions when certain grounds, if urged, might have
prompted unfavorable reactions from judges.s2
50Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 299, 150 N.E. 120, 123 (1925). It is interesting to note that the court hedged by basing its opinion on "health, safety
and morals" grounds, but added "to say nothing of other things such as the destruction of the character of the district as a residential one and the impairment in
value of property already devoted to private residences." Id. at 301, 150 N.E. at
123. See also ERvIN, THE LAW OF BUILDING AND USE RESTRICrIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA
9, 12-14 (1928); Lloyd, Enforcement of Affirmative Agreements Respecting the Use
of Land, 14 VA. L. REv. 419, 430 (1928); Comment, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 128; Notes,
29 Gzo. L. J. 500, 508 (1941); 10 S.C.L.Q. 485 (1958).
SISee notes 2, 18 supra.
52This conclusion is reinforced by Bassett's "Statement of Principles of Zoning,"
in WILLIA s,CrrY PLANNING 204-05 (1922): "Zoning by the exercise of the police
power of the state must relate to the health, safety, morals, order and general
welfare of the community. It follows therefore that police power zoning must be
confined to police power reasons such as fire risk, lack of light and air, congested
living quarters and other conditions inimical to the general welfare. The preventive regulations based on these reasons, which necessarily must be applied differently and in different measure in different districts, naturally group themselves
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As to the rights of interested third parties to enforce zoning restrictions privately, one court has said: 53
"The benefit to be derived from the observance of these zoning
regulations accrues, not only to the municipality, but to the
abutting property owner. The plaintiff, therefore, as to her
capacity to bring this suit, is in a position analogous to that
of one for whose benefit a contract has been made by another
party. Having a substantial interest in the enforcement of the
zoning restrictions, she is a proper party to enforce their observance by a suit for injunction."
Further, keeping in mind the rights of interested persons to enjoin
violations of restrictive covenants, 54 one writer has observed: 55
"Zoning ordinances are evidence of a legislative recognition
of what is fast ripening into a new property right, which might
be termed, a restrictive easement against what someone has
called 'illegitimate and unfair non-conformity' in use of the
5 6
adjoining or neighboring parcels.[ 1 They recognize that a

property owner has a right to expect the municipality in some
degree to protect his property from the blighting effect of nonconforming uses."
If it is necessary to cling to doctrinal labels, then it is probably more
nearly correct to characterize the right as one "in the nature of" a property right, given by zoning legislation, since the right may, if certain
into zoning according to use of structures and land, according to height of building

and according to portion of lot covered by building. Zoning might go further and
embrace the subjects of fire limits, setbacks, and doubtless other classes of regula-

tions. Enhancement of value alone or aesthetics alone has not thus far been considered by the courts to be a sufficient basis for zoning when done under the
police power." (Emphasis added.)
For an excellent monograph emphasizing the differences between, rather than
the similarities of, restrictive covenants and zoning, see Ascher, Private Covenants
in Urban Redevelopment, in Woodbury, URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 221-309 (1953).
53Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 633, 149 N.E. 30, 32 (1925).
54For a collection of cases see 62 HARV. L. REv. 1394 (1949); Annot., 57 A.L.R.

336 (1928).
SsLandels, Zoning: An Analysis of Its Purposes and Its Legal Sanctions, 17
A.B.A.J. 163, 165 (1931).
56See Freund, Some Inadequately Discussed Problems of the Law of City Plan-

ning and Zoning, 24 ILL. L. REv. 135 (1929).
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conditions are met,5 7 be taken away or diminished by the same
58
agency that created it.
For the purposes of analogy, restrictive covenants provide a framework within which people may create, then maintain the stability of,
desirable neighborhoods or communities and preserve the values of
individual properties. Zoning has the same goals. 59
Restrictive covenants and deed restrictions may not be enforced
by a municipality that is not a party to them, but by adopting a
zoning ordinance the desires and intentions of both first and third
parties can be accomplished with less difficulty and better results.6
As for second parties - owners of land who wish to use and develop it
free of governmental interference - "Except in cases of nuisance, there
is a reciprocity of benefits resulting from limitations imposed upon
the use of property by general laws. He who is limited in the use of
his property finds compensation therefor in the benefits accruing to
him from like limitations imposed upon his neighbor."61
ZONING AND OTHER POLICE PowER PROPERTY REGULATIONS

Fire, building, electrical, sanitary, housing, and similar codes regulate the use and development of property under the police power.
While the observance of these codes tends to promote the public
welfare, in particular cases their direct effect upon the public health
and safety is often more readily demonstrable than is the effect of zoning. Like traffic laws, violation of some of these laws may produce a
more immediate and spectacular result than violation of a zoning
ordinance. This field is a third major antecedent of zoning law.
The main differences between zoning and other forms of property
regulation by law are in the types of benefits and remedies intended
for third parties 62 and in the uniformity of application of the regula57See

note 25 supra. See also Notes, 50 MicH. L. REv. 163 (1951); 38 MICH. L.

REv. 431 (1940).
5sReichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 (1932); 16 CoPNEL. L.Q. 579 (1931);
see Annot., 138 A.L.R. 500 (1942).
59
See Bettman, supra note 18, at 840. For a discussion of several theories of
restrictive covenants and a comparison of one of these theories with those of
zoning, see Comment, 3 HASTINGS L.J. 50, 55-56 (Fall 1951).
6OSee Van Hecke, Zoning Ordinances and Restrictions in Deeds, 37 YALE L.J. 407
(1928). See also Annots., 54 A.L.R. 843 (1928); 48 A.L.R. 1437 (1927).
6lState ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923).
62De Blasiis v. Bartell, 143 Pa. Super. 485, 18 A.2d 478 (1941), 21 B.U.L. REv.
556 (1941).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol12/iss1/2

18

Foss: Interested Third Parties in Zoning

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

tions. In regard to uniformity, there are great dangers in zoning unwisely administered, poorly enforced, and too easily amended for
political reasons. 63 Difference in uniformity becomes most important
when third parties seek to assert their rights to continued zoning protection, or to prohibit the relaxation of zoning restrictions on neighboring property. When there is a right, there should be a remedy.
Courts have been reluctant to permit private parties to act as enforcers of police power legislation as applied to property when health,
safety, or morals are concerned, even when conditions provoking
private party action have characteristics of nuisances.64 Whether this
reluctance is justified is debatable; in light of the political and economic considerations, prevention of private enforcement often results
in no enforcement at all. If a person feels that the violation of a
police power regulation on nearby property depreciates the value of
or decreases the satisfaction to be derived from his own property and
has his neighbor arrested for the violation, he runs the risk of a jury's
acquitting the defendant and of finding himself sued for false arrest.
If he seeks to enjoin an actual or threatened violation he is in for a
lot of trouble and expense; he may have to prove special damages and
post a bond in a prohibitive amount. Bringing an unsuccessful civil
or criminal action may subject him to a suit for malicious prosecution,
and attempting to force the authorities to act may subject him to
political reprisals.65 Certainly the obstacles are formidable. 66
Perhaps there should be no court-imposed limitations on the rights
63As put by Landels, supra note 55, at 167: "Zoning, as anyone familiar with
its use by American cities knows, presents an all too available means of arbitrary
and discriminatory interference with property rights. It is an easy means of perpetuating local monopolies and of favoring particular real estate and business
interests. Zoning is particularly open to abuse, because, unlike most legislation, it
does not create regulations applicable to all property or persons coming within
general classifications, but itself determines what property shall come within certain
classifications and applies different regulations to the property so classified."
64See Dunham, Private Enforcement of City Planning, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 463, 476-80 (1955); Annot., 100 A.L.R. 994 (1936).
65See Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1135 (1954).
66This dilemma has been aptly expressed by Landels, supra note 55, at 167: "To
be sure the courts must not substitute their opinion for that of the legislative body,
but they perform no higher function than that of protecting the owner of property from the abuse of legislative discretion. To perform this function properly
when particular instances of this legislation are up for review, a new approach is
needed. This sort of legislation particularly must not 'be judged by theoretical
standards,' but rather 'by the concrete conditions which induced it.'" This applies to administrative as well as legislative functions.
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of third parties to enforce other police power regulations on property.
This is particularly so in zoning, considering the concrete conditions
that induced it; this becomes evident when zoning legislation is
analyzed.
ZONING LEGISLATION

Zoning regulations seek to protect both first and third parties from
the chaotic conditions that formerly existed in unzoned cities. Statutes
and ordinances have provided third parties with rights and remedies
to assure continued zoning protection in three ways.
First, there are those which provide that in the event of a protest
by a designated percentage of property owners within a certain distance of, or in an area included within, property sought to be rezoned, more than a majority vote of the local governing body shall
be required for an amendment. 67 This is designed to prevent hasty
amendments adversely affecting the interests of neighboring owners;
but, in view of the political considerations noted above, it has been
suggested that any requirement short of a unanimous vote constitutes
little protection in most cases.68 There has been some litigation over
the effect and extent of operation of this type of zoning provision,69
70
and over questions of the standing of neighboring owners.
Second, there are provisions giving "any person aggrieved" by a
determination or decision of the administrative official the right to
appeal to the board of adjustment. 71 This category includes not only
those who apply for but are denied building permits or certificates of
occupancy, or who are issued notices to cease violations or stop work
under permits previously issued (second parties), but neighbors protesting the issuance of permits or the refusal of the administrative
official to abate violations (third parties) as well.72 Such an appeal
67FLA. STAT. §176.06

(1957).

68See Freund, supra note 56. Even this limited protection has been crippled
in some jurisdictions by amendments to enabling legislation, so as to facilitate the
passage of zoning amendments. See Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, c. 31247 (reducing "threefourths" vote required to "5 out of 7"). Changes of this nature have gone unnoticed by planners and the general public.
66See Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 335 (1949).
7oSee Annots., 46 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1956); 37 A.L.R.2d 1143 (1954); 174 A.L.R.
549 (1948).
7'FLA. STAT. §176.11 (1957).
72BASSErr, ZONING 123 (2d ed. 1948); 8 MCQUILrN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
622-35, 726-28 (3d ed. 1957); 2 METENBAUM, ZONING 1020-55 (2d ed. 1955); 1 RATH-
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"stays all proceedings in furtherance of the action appealed from," so
that immediate relief may be had from the violation or alleged illegal
construction without having to post bond7 3 Upon the filing of an
appeal the administrative official should immediately issue a stop
order unless he can certify to the board "that by reason of facts
stated in the certificate a stay would, in his opinion, cause imminent
peril to life and property." 74 The appeal to the board is an administrative remedy; it may or may not have to be exhausted before the
aggrieved person seeks judicial relief.75
Upon an appeal, the board has "all the powers of the officer from
whom the appeal is taken." 76 The usual requirement is that four out
of five of the members of the board of adjustment must vote to reverse the administrative official's decision, to decide in favor of the
applicant, or to grant any variation from the literal terms of the
ordinance, thus theoretically making it difficult for one to effect a
departure from the terms and intent of the ordinance. 77 An aggrieved
person also has a right to appeal or to request certiorari to the courts
from the decision of the board of adjustment; but to halt construction
he must then apply to the court for a restraining order to seek a
temporary injunction pendente lite, and he may be required to post
78

bond.

The effect of the above two types of provisions has been held to
give interested third parties a definite place in the zoning picture.7 9
Third, there is another type of provision concerning the rights of
third parties to continued zoning protection: the consent provision,
KOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING

TICE 295 (2d ed. 1953).
3
7 FLA. STAT. §176.11

622-36 (3d ed. 1956); 1

YOKLEY,

ZONING LAW AND

PRAC-

(1957).

741d. §176.12.

75Hennessy v. Fort Lauderdale, 101 So.2d 176 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958); see 8
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 701-07 (3d ed. 1957).
76
FLA. STAT. § 176.15 (1957).

MCQUILLIN,
77

Even this protective feature has been emasculated by an ill-advised amendment
to enabling legislation in at least one jurisdiction; see ARiz. CODE ANN. § 16-403

(Cum. Supp. 1952), changing number of members of board from "five" to " 5 but
not more than 7" and vote required to alter official's decision, etc., from "4 out
of 5" to "a majority." Another jurisdiction has had a poor system since the beginning of zoning, with a paid three-man board of adjustment which can reverse
the official and grant variances by a two-thirds vote. ALA. CODE tit. 63, §717 (1940).
7
SFLA. STAT. §176.17 (1957).

79Ayer v. Cram, 242 Mass. 30, 136 N.E. 338 (1922); Conaway v. Atlantic City,
107 N.J.L. 404, 154 Atl. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Madden v. Zoning Board, 48 R.I. 175,
136 AtI. 493 (1927).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1959], Art. 2
THIRD PARTIES IN ZONING

under which an applicant for a building or occupancy permit is required to obtain the consent of certain of his neighbors before he may
apply for, or before a board may grant, zoning relief. Some of these
provisions have been upheld, while others have been declared invalid
for various reasons.80 The important point is that these provisions
are further evidence of legislative intent to grant special benefits to
third parties under zoning regulations.
Third-party benefits constitute the basic justification for land use
control under the police power rather than under the power of eminent domain. 8' If owners of developed property accept zoning limitations on the use of their property and then see the limitations on
their neighbors' vacant property relaxed under political and economic
pressure unrelated to sound planning and zoning practice, their compensation is valueless -they have received a bad bargain. The invidious distinctions sought to be avoided are instead created. It is unfortunate, but this sort of thing goes on all the time.
Zoning legislation, then, expressly and impliedly, provides interested third parties with claims for judicial consideration when their
rights or benefits under zoning are threatened by first or second parties. The Arkansas enabling act perhaps goes further than any other
82
in proclaiming:
"It is recognized and hereby declared that the beauty of surroundings constitutes a valuable property right which should
be protected by law, and that this is particularly true of residential sections where people have established their homes."
VARYING JUDICIAL ATriTUDES

Very few zoning disputes get into court compared with the number
argued before local governing bodies, planning commissions, and
boards of adjustment; and even fewer reach appellate courts whose
opinions are reported. 3 Yet it is those reported opinions that have
soSee Havighurst, Property Owners' Consent Provisions in Zoning Ordinances,
36 W. VA. L. REv. 175 (1930); Note, 1954 U. ILL. L.F. 309; Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d
551 (1952); ANN. CAs. 1914A, §§972 et. seq.
slSee note 61 supra and accompanying text. See also BAmR, THE LEGAL AsPEcts
OF ZONING 38-39 (1927).
8ZARK. STAT. ANN. §19-2804 (1947).
83See HoRAcK and NOLAN, LAND USE CONMOLS 177, n.50 (1955): "Again accu-

rate statistics are unavailable, but it would be a safe estimate, at least in Indiana,
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the greatest influence on lawyers who must advise their clients about
zoning matters. If interested third parties, faced with loss of zoning
protection, are advised, "You can't beat city hall, and it's going to
cost a lot to go to court, where your chances of winning are not much
better," then zoning protection is illusory indeed.
Much has been written about the reluctance of courts to condone
interference with a person's supposed right to use his own property
as he pleases. 8 While the maxim is that a person cannot use his property in a way that injures his neighbor in the enjoyment of his property,85 in zoning matters a noticeable regard for the rights of second
parties over those of first and third parties is often apparent. In addition, zoning is new and therefore has not been fully analyzed by
many courts in several areas, as when courts confuse nuisance law with
zoning. A particular court may waver back and forth and contradict
itself for years.8 6 To paraphrase McQuillin - when comparing statutes and the holdings of courts in various states, it appears that the
authorities are in conflict not wholly explainable by differences in
legislation or in administrative remedies.87 This is an understatement.
Perhaps the conflict may be explained by the economic, political,
and social backgrounds of the judges themselves. 8 It is certainly true
to say that not one case in a thousand reaches an appellate tribunal." In St.
Petersburg, Fla., only one appeal has been taken from a decision of the board of
adjustment since its creation in 1933, and that petition for certiorari died in circuit court on the question of the petitioner's standing.
84There does not appear to have ever been such an unqualified right, but it
is repeatedly heard proclaimed, even by some lawyers who should know better.
85cSc Smead, Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas: A Basis of the State Police
Power, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 276 (1936).
86See Babcock, The Illinois Supreme Court and Zoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 87

(1947).
87See

8 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs 701 (3d ed. 1957).
ssSee FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1935); Comment, 32 YALE L.J. 833
(1923). Here in Florida there has rarely been a time since the inception of zoning
when there could be said to have existed a "normal" real estate market in many
sections of the state. Rather, the most significant aspect of the market has been
speculation in raw land or building lots; and second parties have been predominantly powerful politically, so much so that Florida was the last state to
adopt a general enabling act for zoning (1939) and still does not have general
legislation for planning commissions exercising control over land subdivisions.
Perhaps these factors help explain judicial hostility toward land use controls in
this state. See the recent case of Kass v. Lewin, 104 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1958). For a
review of zoning in Florida to 1953, see Bartley, Legal Problems in Florida Municipal Zoning, 6 U. FLA. L. REV. 366 (1953).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1959], Art. 2
THIRD PARTIES IN ZONING
that arguments about zoning generate more heat but shed less light
than any other subject in local government today. A comparison of
two recent opinions from the Florida Supreme Court illustrates these
varying judicial attitudes. In Wags Transportation System, Inc. v.
Miami Beach,s ° complainants seeking to enjoin the city from enforcing residential zoning restrictions against their property received
a favorable decision in the trial court. The city did not appeal, so
nearby property owners who were not parties sought to intervene
for the purpose of taking the appeal, despite the rule that there can
be no intervention after final decree. The homeowners brought certiorari from the denial of their petition; in reversing, the Supreme
Court, citing little authority, said:90
"Petitioners' property was purchased on the strength of the
zoning ordinance and in reliance upon the fact that all property
within the zoning district would be maintained as residential
property ....
"We think the petition to intervene showed such an interest
in the res that the ends of justice require that it be granted.
It was dearly within the exception to the general rule. Nothing
is more sacred to one than his home and the petitioners should
have been permitted to come in and bring their rights in this
to the attention of the court. .-. . [I]t would be contrary to
every element of due process to hold that the owner should not
be permitted to intervene and bring or help bring these factors
to the attention of the court."
However, the Court was not inclined to hold with the intervenors upon
a final hearing on the merits; 9' but the case illustrates an enlightened
8988 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1956).

9old. at 752.
OiDukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal,20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 218, 236 (1955), foreshadowed the result of Wags in later litigation.
In Miami Beach v. Prevatt, 97 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1957), the Supreme Court talked
at length of the virtues of the "fairly debatable" rule, and concluded, in effect,
that the only recourse of interested third parties is the ballot box. Unless the
Court begins to recognize third-party interest in zoning matters, one can expect
more situations to arise like that in Miami Beach v. Schauer, 104 So.2d 129 (3d
D.CA. Fla. 1958). This is not to say that courts should sit as "super zoning
boards"; the point is that now that the Court has emphatically endorsed first-party
interest in zoning (except when it finds the constitutional rights of second parties impaired), it should also recognize and protect the third point of the triangle
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judicial attitude toward the purposes of zoning as respects the rights
of interested third parties.
By way of contrast, in Boucher v. Novotny92 the Court had to decide whether to require that private parties seeking to enjoin a zoning
violation prove special damages. The complainants were property
owners immediately across the street from, and in the same zone as,
premises for which the respondents procured a building permit, which
was apparently illegally issued for another motel. Construction had
started when it appeared that the proposed building violated front
and side line setback requirements. The complainants were able to
get the building inspector to halt construction for a time, but the city
governing body ordered the permit reissued. Suit was then filed, with
the complainants alleging special damage by virtue of depreciation of
property value and loss of zoning protection. This was not sufficient
for the Court, however, which held that special damages must be
alleged and proved and that the complainants had not done so,
saying,93
"We have the view that the rule of our cases cited above with
reference to the abatement of alleged nuisances resulting from
threatened or consummated municipal conduct is equally applicable to actions to remedy or prevent breaches of municipal
zoning ordinances."
This case is illustrative of a narrow judicial attitude toward the right
of interested third parties to continued zoning protection. 94 Its effect
upon the advice that attorneys will give their clients and upon future
zoning practices is not mitigated by the Court's observation that "this
opinion is not to be construed as any endorsement of the zoning procedures that were employed in the instant case nor as an encouragement to ignore the requirements of municipal zoning ordinances." 95

from the combined attack of the first and second.
92102 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1958).
931d. at 135.

94Compare this case with Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933) (restrictive covenant). As to private restrictions, see Van Hecke, Injunctions to Remove or Remodel Structures Erected in Violation of Building Restrictions, 32

TExAs L. REV. 521 (1954).
95102 So.2d at 137.
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L GisirvE POSSIB=xrMs
Amendment
If zoning is to be an effective tool for urban development, many of
the present stumbling blocks must be reshaped into stepping stones.
Beginning with legislation, those interested in sound zoning must first
of all be vigilant to oppose ill-advised amendments to zoning statutes
designed to facilitate erosion of the zoning system, such as those previously noted. 96 The arguments usually heard from those whose main
interest in zoning is to aid real estate speculation are that (1) zoning
should not stand in the way of progress (ignoring the fact that sound
zoning generally is progress); (2) there is not enough business and industrially zoned land (which can and should be determined by planning studies, not by speculative hearsay); and (3) if zoning restrictions
are relaxed, the city will benefit materially from subsequent "improve97
ments." Such arguments exclude planning.
Certain amendments to enabling legislation are needed.98 Zoning
acts should provide that when "dezoning" is sought and a designated
percentage of nearby property owners within 500 feet from or included
within the area in question protest, a favorable vote of all members
of the legislative body recorded as present at the meeting must be required for the amendment to be effective.99 This constitutes built-in
protection for third parties; but, under many such provisions as now
worded, third parties have been getting the short end of the stick.
Injunctive Relief
Most enabling legislation provides that the city, proper local au96See notes 68, 77 supra.
97See note 28 supra. Large national concerns seeking plant or branch locations
are not interested in loose zoning practices, either for themselves or their employees.
Their vital concern is that cities where they are considering locating have sound
zoning for residential as well as business and industrial uses. They are interested
in protection, not speculation. The arguments of speculators should be exposed
for what they generally are: specious devices to obtain speculative increases in
vacant land values, often at the expense of owners of neighboring developed land
and the community.
OsLegally trained zoning hearing examiners may be superior to planning commissions in holding rezoning hearings and making recommendations. Pinellas
County, Fla., has recently hired such an examiner.
99See Freund, supra note 56.
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thorities, or other bodies may seek injunctive relief from zoning violations.100 There is no practical reason for denying injunctive relief
to interested third parties; the only possible logical objection is that
when there is such a provision and third parties are not specifically
included, they are excluded by virtue of the maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. One court has so suggested;? 1 others have refused to apply the maxim after viewing the statute as a whole and
ascertaining its purposes.10 2 To resolve any doubts, this type of provision can be amended to provide that interested third parties may
have injunctive relief in zoning matters without proof of special damages. 10 3 Several courts have already reached this conclusion without
specific legislative direction.104 Such a remedy should be spelled out
in the ordinance regardless of whether it is expressly set out in the
enabling act.
Appeal
Another legislative change is needed when an enabling act provides that an aggrieved person may petition the court for a writ of
certiorari from a decision of the board of adjustment. 0 5 The theory
behind this type of provision is that the board of adjustment is a
body of experts whose opinion should not be overturned lightly, and
that claims for judicial relief should be based on the record and not
be tried de novo. In practice this theory often has proved fallacious.
Many boards have tended to abuse their powers by paying no attention to the law, except for the purpose of preparing elaborate records
in justification of their actions so as to make anticipated appeals more
difficult. Also, many records are kept inadequately or not at all, so
that courts attempting to work under such a statute have often found
it necessary to send cases back to the board so that adequate records
could be prepared and certified. The board is an administrative body
with quasi-judicial powers, not a court. Rules from the field of ad100FLA. STAT.

§176.23 (1957).

lolWhitridge v. Park, 100 Misc. 367, 165 N.Y. Supp. 640 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 179
App. Div. 884, 165 N.Y. Supp. 640 (1st Dep't 1917).
1o2State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929),
cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929); see Annot., 54 A.L.R. 366 (1928).
lO3For provisions of similar effect, see Lynn v. Goldman, 216 Md. 562, 141 A.2d
172 (1958); City of Graham v. Wheeless, 89 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
lo4See Annot., 54 A.L.R. 366 (1928). See also 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 862-67 (3d ed. 1957).
105FLA. STAT. §176.17 (1957).
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ministrative law apply to the board of adjustment, though this is
often not mentioned in legal writings. Better zoning practice will result if appeal and trial de novo are provided. The court should
also have the record, additional testimony, and all the powers of the
board of adjustment and its administrative official at its disposal, so
that the entire matter may be adjudicated.
Notice
A final matter is that of notice. When zoning statutes or ordinances provide only that "public notice" be given of pending applications for amendments or board of adjustment actions, rarely do persons who are entitled to notice receive it if one or more publications
in a newspaper are deemed sufficient. Such publications often give
only a legal description of the property involved and the fact that an
application is pending, without advising interested persons of the
change sought. Due process objections to zoning notice provisions
have been effectively registered in many jurisdictions. 10 6 In accord
with Cardozo's maxim "Disclosure is the antidote to partiality and
favor," the statute and the ordinance should provide that the property
be posted a sufficient length of time before the hearing and that
notices be mailed to nearby property owners and lessees who may be
affected.
OTHER POSSMILITIES

One of the problems hindering progress toward more effective
zoning is that most people simply are not aware of current developments in the zoning area; they do not realize that what they regard as
a bulwark has been subject to constant erosion. Public education is
vital. It is important to enlighten people, and this can be accomplished in various ways. The press is often interested in zoning and
is quick to seize upon specific evils when they are disclosed. 0 7 The
National Municipal League long ago perfected techniques that citizens
and civic associations may apply to obtain more voice in local governb06A number of specific problems cannot be discussed fully in a general article
such as this. This article should be followed by another dealing more specifically
with remedies for aggrieved third persons.
107Note the series of articles and editorials in the March, 1958, issues of the
Tampa Tribune, culminating in the editorial Lessons of the Warehouse Rebellion,

Mar. 27, p. 14-A.
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ment. It has also been suggested that property owners' associations
might be effective,Os but there is a split of authority as to whether
these groups have standing in zoning cases.10 9 Moral: Always include
an individual property owner as a plaintiff.
Zoning administration should be handled by planning and zoning
departments so that zoning may be correlated with recordation of
subdivision plats, existing land use studies, city plans, and like matters.
Applications for amendments, variances, and the like should more than
pay for themselves by appropriate fees, as these are special services
for private benefit; the general public should not be required to subsidize land developers' petitions for zoning relaxation.110 Enforcement
may be shared with building departments, provided final decisions
on zoning matters are made in planning departments. To be effective,
however, local governing bodies and courts must be impressed with
the importance of holding the line in questionable areas. For example,
it is often argued that since an old residential district is "going to
business," zoning amendments and variances should be readily granted.
The people in such neighborhoods often cannot defend themselves
and their established values as vigorously as can those owning homes
in new, expensive subdivisions. Yet an ill-advised amendment or
variance in an older area can do more damage more quickly than in
a new one.1" Two wrongs do not make a right, and many courts have
held that existing nonconforming uses or questionable amendments
or variances in a neighborhood do not justify adding another. However, the cry invariably goes up that this should justify more questionable zoning practices; most often the crier is the one who is looking for a profit at the expense of established values in a neighborhood.
lOSSee Dunham, supra note 64.
i09Garden Dist. Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. New Orleans, 233 La. 317, 98 So.2d
922 (1957); Norwood Heights Improv. Ass'n v. Mayor, 195 Md. 368, 73 A.2d 529

(1950).
IlOFoss, Planning and Zoning Fees, Municipal South 32 (Mar. 1959). For an
interesting study of zoning administration see LEARY, A MODEL PROCEDURE FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION OF ZONING REGULATIONS (1958). However, the writer disagrees with
some of the author's conclusions and recommendations, such as having the zoning
administrator appointed by the head of the department of building inspection

rather than by the planning director. Zoning is too much a part of planning
to be separated from that department, though it is wise to have separate offices for

planning and zoning administration on one hand and advance planning on the
other, with the planning director correlating the efforts of both. Unfortunately

the study gives scant consideration to interested third parties in the zoning process.
'lSee Comment, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 599 (1953).
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The question has been raised whether any city can make significant
progress in halting urban blight solely through use of the police
power.11'2 In Florida the Supreme Court has indirectly urged that
cities should utilize the police power to a greater extent. In declaring
use of the power of eminent domain unconstitutional for slum clearance and resale of cleared land to private enterprise for redevelopment, the Court has said that "the police power is ample.""13 What
does this mean? Will the Court uphold further usage of the police
power in practice, or is it merely expounding a nice theory? May
third parties affected by the failure of a city to enforce its own laws
go into court to abate conditions that harm them as well as the community with a reasonable expectation that the courts will deem
their rights worthy of protection? One idea in zoning is that "an ounce
of prevention is worth a pound of cure"; under the Court's opinion
may the police power be used to prevent as well as to "remove or
abate a blighted area"?
JUDICIAL POSSIBILITIES

Zoning law is still comparatively new in this country, though its
historical roots lie deep in the past. As a field of law, land use controls will continue to grow at an accelerating rate as problems created
by population growth and new technology increase, and as the wants
and desires of people change. Whether some of the things that have
happened and are happening in zoning are "good" or "bad" is arguable, but there can be no argument about the fact that cities have
pressing problems and that something needs to be done about them.
Concern with individual property rights on the part of courts is
admirable, since the protection of economic independence is as essential to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as is the protection
of other rights. In a specific zoning case, however, when a property
owner is seeking to change an existing condition by asking for zoning
relief or when the local authorities have illegally sought to grant him
zoning relief at the possible expense of others, a court should not
consider the property rights of that one owner to be any more important than the rights - whether denoted as property, legal, personal,
112Brown, Urban Redevelopment, 29 B.U.L. REv. 318 (1949); Siegel, Slum Prevention -A Public Purpose, 35 CHI. BAR. Rio. 151 (1954); Note, 41 MINN. L. REv.
219 (1957).
"13Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1952). But see Mendelker, Public Purpose in Urban Redevelopment, 28 TUL. L. REv. 96 (1953).
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or otherwise - of any other person, much less an entire neighborhood,
or of the community at large. How third parties are affected is an
important question.
The purposes of zoning have been defeated many times in the
courts, not only in third-party suits for injunctions but in cases in
which the question raised was whether a third party was an "aggrieved
person" within the meaning of the statutes. There has been a tendency on the part of the courts to equate the question of whether
one is an aggrieved person with whether he has alleged and proved
special damages, as in cases of public nuisances. In a case not involving
zoning the United States Supreme Court has reasserted the rule that
"aggrieved person" statutes extend remedies to persons who would
not otherwise have standing to sue.11 4 The cases noted by the Court,
however, emphasize that to be an aggrieved person one must have a
financial interest at stake; even this limitation should not be applicable in zoning matters, where the values sought to be protected are
not always translatable into monetary terms." 5 An answer has been
suggested by one author:116

"Sound development of the law of standing requires a stripping away of the highly conceptual and needlessly complex refinements concerning 'interests,' 'rights,' and private representation of the public interest. Every issue of standing, unless the
statute raises unusual issues, involves the basically simple problem of whether or not the petitioner's asserted interest is in the
circumstances deserving of legal protection. That problem may
be and should be discussed without any attendant complexity
of doctrine."
Indeed, one may be aggrieved by the loss of a personal or legal right,
7
as well as by loss of a property right."
One of the main causes of poor court decisions, it has been urged,
114American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 325 U.S. 385
(1944).
115See WILLIAMS, CITY PLANNING AND ZONING 207-09
Land Use Controls, 7 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1958).

(1922); Kramer, Values in

See also Wags Transp. System, Inc.

v. Miami Beach, 88 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1956).
116Davis, Standing to Challenge and to Enforce Administrative Action, 49

COLUM. L. REV. 759, 791 (1949).
117See definitions of aggrieved and aggrieved party in BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY
(4th ed. 1951); WEBSTER, NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged 2d ed. 1956).
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is that planners have not had a larger part in the preparation of
zoning cases for trial.11 Such cases cannot be handled as other real
property matters; it is necessary that attorneys have complete command of the concepts and goals of zoning law."x9 Courts cannot render competent decisions in technical matters when cases are inadequately prepared and presented. For instance, since monetary values
are more easily measured than are other values, and since courts have
found evidence of financial benefit or loss to be very important in
zoning cases,120 certainly such evidence is indispensable at trial.21
When the amendment or relaxation of zoning restrictions is being opposed by interested third parties, if the zoning authorities have made
or are considering making changes without having undertaken planning studies, the fact should be brought out. When changes are
sought to be made for purely political or selfish reasons, it is imperative that the court be made aware of it.122
If the question of the type and extent of relief that a court may
grant is in doubt, "the types of judicial relief must not be placed in
unyielding categories; it often occurs that a court must improvise
relief which a particular case warrants, and the courts should continue
to be able to do so."' 23 Applying this thought to zoning, it is more
realistic and just to borrow rules and concepts from the law of restrictive covenants than from the law of nuisances and other types of
lisSee Babcock, Emerging Legal Issues in Zoning, PLANNING 133 (1958). For an
excellent outline on handling zoning cases see Fonoroff, Preparingthe Zoning Case,
PLANNING 32 (1958).
119HoRAcx and NOLAN, LAND USE CONTROLS Xi

(1955): "No longer can the
property lawyer advise his clients by referring simply to private covenants, doctrines
of waste, recording acts, and familiar categories of interests and encumbrances. At
every stage he must be fully acquainted with the statutory law of land use. If he
is unprepared to cope with this new law of property the lawyer will be in much
the same position as his colleague of a few years ago, who was planning estates
while unprepared in the field of taxation." For examples of some pitfalls see Comment, 1958 Wis. L. R.v. 128.
'12OSee Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L.
REv. 650, 669 (1958).
12lExpert witnesses on questions of depreciation of property values need not be
appraisers; they may be real estate salesmen familiar with the locality involved.

See note 30 supra.
122"The courts ... have not been unworldly enough to ignore the effect of an
anxious client and persistent counsel on the minds of councilmen." Wilcox v.
Pittsburgh, 121 F.2d 835, 837 (1941).
123Carrow, Types of Judicial Relief from Administrative Action, 58 COLUM. L.
Rxv. 1, 23 (1958). See also State ex rel. George v. Hull, 65 Wyo. 251, 199 P.2d 832

(1948).
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property regulation under the police power. As previously indicated,
some courts have found special damage in the mere violation of zoning restrictions,124 but the more sensible justification is, as in the case
of restrictive covenants, not to require any showing of actual damage
125
- a realistic position taken by at least one court.
CONCLUSION

In practically all communities zoning has been adopted because
interested third parties have desired its protection and have brought
pressure to bear on local government to provide the protection. The
creation of zoning protection and its maintenance are two different
things; if public interest tends toward apathy, then poor administration and enforcement, together with political and economic factors,
combine to debilitate zoning. When a neighborhood begins to lose
its zoning protection and is invaded by one or more inconsistent land
uses, or other requirements are relaxed for private profit at public
expense, neighborhood pride gives way to indifference or a desire to
sell out and move to another location. This change of local attitude
is the next step toward the creation of a slum. The community as
well as individual property owners are the losers when slums spring
up and property values decline, whether relatively, absolutely, or both.
The few voices raised in protest- compared with the number that
might be heard if the public were fully aware of what was going on are heard from neighborhoods where particular oxen are gored in
more dramatic fashion.
In the 1949 Housing Act, as amended in 1954, the Federal Government made it a condition precedent to obtaining certain forms of
federal aid for slum clearance and redevelopment, public housing,
and mortgage insurance that communities have "workable programs
for urban renewal," to be resubmitted, reviewed, and approved or
disapproved each year by the Housing and Home Finance Agency.126
The idea is very practical; it does little lasting good for the Government to pour millions into local communities to eradicate slums if
those communities continue to allow new slums to take their place.
124See Polk v. Axton, 306 Ky. 498, 208 S.W.2d 497 (1948), and cases cited therein.

l2SSnow v. Johnston, 197 Ga. 146, 28 S.E.2d 270 (1943). Keeping in mind the
similarity of purposes of restrictive covenants and zoning, see Oosterhouse v. Brummel, 343 Mich. 283, 72 N.W.2d 6 (1955) (restrictive covenant case).
126See Slayton, Conservation of Existing Housing, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
436 (1955).
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Only local government can do effective, continuing housekeeping in
its own home. If the city fails to pass and to enforce its own zoning,
housing, building, and other codes, and if it is not interested in
planning for its own future, why should Uncle Sam bail it out from
time to time? Alas, the program has had limited success. At every
convention of the United States Conference of Mayors and of the
American Municipal Association since 1954, pressure has been brought
and resolutions passed calling - directly or indirectly - for the relaxation of workable program requirements. It is shrewder politics
back home to get big federal grants than to clean house.
Even the required workable program for urban renewal offers
little immediate hope for sounder zoning practice, and the burden
of fighting for good zoning practices will continue to be upon third
parties. As these parties slowly come to realize that holes are being
bored in their zoning dikes, perhaps they will become more inclined
to protect their interests - by litigation if necessary. When that happens, possibly they will find greater consideration for their rights
in the courts as the courts become more conversant with the history,
purposes, constitutional bases, and provisions of zoning law.
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